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1.  Reference and coreference - the traditional pieture and recent 
developments 
Since  the  early days  of discourse  analysis  coreference  has  always  been considered a 
major factor in the formation of texts and dialogues. The repetition of nominal elements 
and  the  anaphoric use of pronouns  in  successive  sentences  is  a fundamental  cohesive 
pattern which  ties  sentences  together  and  contributes  to  the  coherence  of sequences. 
"La coherence  transphrastique  trouve  dans  la  pronominalisation un des  procedes  les 
plus  efficaces"  (Stati  1990,  160).  The  basic  structural pattern on which  linguists  fo-
cused their interest in the early 1970s is captured by the following examples: 
(1)  A man entered the house. After closing the door, the man sat down. He was tired. 
(2)  Peter 
The man  entered the house.  He was tired. 
He 
In languages  like  English or German,  which  have  an  indefinite  article,  a bit  of dis-
course can,  for  example,  be  opened  by  a sentence  with  an indefinite  noun phrase  in 
subject position.  It can be  continued by  successively adding a sentence with adefinite 76  Gerd Fritz 
noun phrase and then one with an anaphoric pronoun in their respective subject posi-
tions.  One may generally also use a proper name in the opening sentence, whereas the 
use of adefinite noun phrase or a pronoun requires special conditions. This early model 
is basically correct, as  far as  it goes.  But it is  neither flexible enough to  cover all the 
relevant  facts  - e.g.  pronouns  as  variables  or so-called  referential  uses  of definite 
descriptions -,  nor does it allow an explanation of the relevant facts.  These limitations 
are mainly due to a restriction to structural properties of the sentences involved, that is 
to say to grammatical and lexical properties. And, of course, most of this work concen-
trated on monological sequences. 
In the last 15  years or so  there has been considerable progress in the field.  As  far 
as I can see this progress can mainly be attributed to three developments: 
Firstly,  elements of a genuine  theory  of reference,  mainly  developed  by  philoso-
phers of language, have been taken up by linguists and other students of reference. 
Secondly,  we have seen the  development of more sophisticated theories of coher-
ence. 
Thirdly,  there  has  been  much  relevant  empirical  work  in  linguistics,  sociology, 
psychology and natural language processing,  mainly on the  strategies for the  reso-
lution of anaphora and for the choice of adequate referring expressions. 
Maybe  the  decisive  factor  of progress  was  a  change  of perspective:  Reference  and 
coreference were no longer analysed in terms of linguistic structures alone but in terms 
of communicative tasks to be accomplished by using referring expressions.  In this per-
spective, the basic questions would be:  How do speakers introduce objects of talk into 
their shared universe of discourse, how do  they keep track of such objects and how is 
this  referential  activity  connected  to  other  aspects  of discourse.  From  this  point  of 
view,  the  analysis of dialogue becomes particularly interesting for  several reasons,  of 
which I shall just mention three: 
(i)  In analysing problems of reference in dialogue we have to  explicitly take  into  ac-
count the interlocking perspectives of speaker and hearer and their respective states 
of knowledge,  including  their mutual  knowledge.  This aspect was  stressed by  re-
searchers in the tradition of conversation analysis (cf.  Schegloff 1972) and also by 
linguists and psychologists (cf.  Fritz 1982,  149ff., Clark/Wilkes-Gibbs 1986). 
(ii)  In face-to-face dialogue we have all kinds of ad-hoc resources of reference (e.g. the 
thing  over there or what you  said just now)  and  we  also  find  devices  for  on-line 
reference clarification, like the cooperative search for the name of an intended ref-
erent in example (3): Coreference in Dialogue 
(3)  A:  You remember the English lecturer we talked to in Glasgow? 
B:  Jimmy Burnett 
A:  No, Jimmy is in the German Department 
B:  Y  ou mean Dr. McAllister? 
A:  Yes Dr. McAllister. I met him in London the other day 
77 
(iii) Many  objects  of reference  are  actually  created  in  the  course  of dialogue.  Lets 
imagine the members of a language department decide to reform their teaching pro-
gramme.  At some point in the  discussion  someone  suggests  the  introduction of a 
new study course. Soon people start referring to  "the new study course". Although 
it  is  not yet born,  it is  already acquiring an identity of its  own.  By  referring to  it 
again  and  again  and  by  suggesting  future  properties  of the  course,  the  planning 
committee anchor the  new  object in their own web of beliefs.  After a while  they 
might even decide to  give it a name,  lets say  "Text Production and Media". What 
we have in such a case is the emergence of a new object in dialogue. 
2.  Research on (co )reference in discourse - some areas of progress 
After  having  given  some  background  to  the  main points  of this  paper,  I  shall  now 
sketch some results from  the  areas of progress I mentioned before, without, however, 
going into the history of the field in any detail. 
2.1  Theories of reference 
Reference has been a major topic in philosophy at least since Frege and Russell.  These 
logicians inspired much of the work on  reference which philosophers of language did 
from  the  1950s  onwards  (Quine,  Geach,  Strawson,  just to  mention  three  prominent 
,~  names).  In  his  1964  paper  on  "Identifying  reference  and  truth-values"  Strawson fo-
cussed on the importance of identifying knowledge,  an aspect which was later stressed 
by  researchers  in conversation analysis  and  in  artificial  intelligence.  Another  Oxford 
philosopher, Peter Geach showed that there are different uses of pronouns, at least one 
of which is  not  referential in the  strict sense at all  (Geach 1962).  Later on Donnellan 
(1966)  drew attention to  different uses of definite descriptions,  so-called  "attributive" 
and  "referential" uses.  A long  discussion on the  semantic properties of proper names 
was initiated by Kripke, amongst others (Kripke  1972, Dummett 1973). For some years 
now  genericity has  been a focus  of interest in semantics  (cf. Krifka  1988).  Useful re-
cent work in the tradition of formal semantics includes studies in Discourse Represen-
tation  Theory  (e.g.  Kamp  1985,  Asher  1993).  An important  insight  in  philosophical 
theories of reference was the "discovery" of speaker's reference as opposed to semantic 
reference.  This  concept was  foreshadowed  in  Strawson's  and  Donnellan's  work and 78  Gerd Fritz 
was  made  the  foundation  of a theory  of reference  in Searle  (1969).  It is  this  type of 
theory of reference in particular which inspired work in dialogue analysis when,  from 
the  late  1970s  onwards,  linguists  and  other  researchers  in  the  field  of reference  and 
coreference increasingly availed themselves of the ideas developed in philosophy.l 
2.2  Theories of coherence 
As for theories of coherence, there are two basic ideas which are shared by many pres-
ent-day  theorists.  The first  idea  is:  Coherence  is  primarily a matter of language  use. 
Qnly in a derivative sense is  it a matter of the  stmcture of linguistic expressions like 
sentences and noun phrases. This idea took some time in gaining ground in the  1970s, 
but it is fairly well entrenched today. The second idea is:  There are different organizing 
principles for discourse, which speakers and hearers follow to build and to grasp coher-
ent sequences. If  we want to understand the problem of coherence we must understand 
these organizing principles and their modes of interaction. The following is  a short list 
of basic organizing principles for dialogue:2 
(4)  (a)  linguistic acts and their local and global sequencing patterns 
(b)  propositional connections between linguistic acts 
(c)  principles of topic management 
(d)  the  dynamics  of knowledge  states  and  knowledge  constellations  (e.g.  the 
growth of mutual knowledge, inference-making) 
(e)  communicative  principles  (e.g.  relevance,  comprehensibility,  precision, 
originality, politeness) 
(1)  linguistic  mIes  (syntactic,  lexical and phonological)  for  the  implementation of 
these principles in individuallanguages 
In this kind of framework problems of reference and  coreference are linked to  all the 
organizing principles on the list. 
2.3  Empirical work on reference and coreference 
Finally, as for empirical work, there has been a lot of research especially on resolution 
of anaphora in psychology, artificial intelligence and comprehensibility research. I only 
mention  Hobbs  (1979),  Tyler/Marslen-Wilson  (1982)  and  Pause  (1984)  - there  are 
dozens of papers on this topic.  The main focus  in this  line of research is  the  question: 
How do listeners find out what anaphorical pronouns refer to in cases like (5)? 
(5)  John can open Bill's safe. He knows the combination. Coreference in Dialogue  79 
In  general  terms,  the  answer to  this  question  is  the  following:  Hearers use  different 
kinds of cues from different aspects of discourse. They use syntactical and lexical cues, 
they use the  principle of topic  continuity, they use  cues from  sequencing patterns (the 
second sentence can be understood as  an explanation of the  fact  presented by the  first 
sentence), they use mutual knowledge of the participants (e.g.  stereotypical knowledge 
about safes and people, so-called "frame knowledge": We know that safes have combi-
nations and that only their owners should know them);  furthermore cues may  be taken 
from the special knowledge acquired during the actual discourse and so on.  Now this is 
exactly  the  kind of result one  would  expect if one  had  the  kind  of theory  I sketched 
before, where different organizing principles interact. 
In the same traditions we find  a smaller amount of work on the choice of referring 
expressions  in  discourse.  Some  of  this  work  is  summarized  and  documented  in 
Grosz/Joshi/Weinstein (1995).  In linguistics  recent work includes  Fox (1987)  which I 
shall refer to in the next paragraph. 
3.  Interaction of (co  )reference with other aspects of dialogue 
After having outlined some of the areas of progress in the field of (co)reference, I shall 
spend the rest of this paper on two  groups of examples and some theoretical problems 
they  pose.  The  examples  of the  first  group  are  meant  to  show  some  connections  be-
tween  reference/coreference  and  several  of the  other  aspects  of dialogue  mentioned 
above, viz the type of linguistic acts performed, topic-management, and the observance 
of communicative principles.  The examples of the second group, which concern hypo-
thetical  and  fictional  talk,  are  intended  to  show  how  continuity  of reference  is  con-
nected to  continuity of what one might call modal profile.  So  I now  start off with ex-
amples where the business of referring interacts with the functional aspect of dialogue. 
3.1  Reference and the function of linguistic utterances 
In order to  show  the  interaction of referential  aspect and  functional  (or illocutionary) 
aspect I shall  give  you  a very  simple example.  In  (6)  a mother complains  about  her 
daughter's dress habits, and a second mother replies to this complaint: 
(6)  A:  Anna has taken to wearing skirts lately 
B:  All girls of her group at school have given up wearing jeans 
Now  this  bit of dialogue  looks  as  if all  there  was  to  be  said  about  it  concerned  the 
propositional level.  The first utterance is a statement about one particular girl.  And the 
second utterance is  a closely related general statement about a group of which the girl 
mentioned in the first utterance is a member.  So part of the coherence of this sequence 80  Gerd Fritz 
is  built on relationships of reference and  predication. But there is  more to it than that. 
Generalising on a particular statement is a distinct type of linguistic act in its own right 
with quite interesting functional and sequential properties. In reacting to a statement by 
generalising in the above fashion,  one  implicitly accepts the  proposition,  but one does 
not leave  it at that.  One  lifts  the  topic  to  a higher level,  so  to  speak.  In doing  so,  a 
speaker  may  for  instance  show  the  previous  speaker  that  there  is  no  need  to  worry 
about a fact which is not an individual problem but a general tendency in a certain age 
group.  So what emerges is  that there is  quite a subtle interaction between the proposi-
tional  and  the  functional  levels,  and  it  is  this  interaction - together  with  a  certain 
amount  of mutual  knowledge  - which  produces  the  coherence  of this  dialogue  se-
quence.  Furthermore these two utterances could be the first steps in the development of 
a distinct topic,  say  "elothing problems with school girls".  There is  also  the  converse 
sequence of general and particular statement, like in (7): 
(7)  A:  All small girls want to wear skirts these days 
B:  My daughter doesn't 
Here we have a typical case of contradiction by counterexemple.  There are many more 
interesting aspects of sequences with general and particular statements. But I shallleave 
the topic here. 
A  second  type  of elose  relation between  reference  and  illocution  is  reported  by 
Barbara Fox in her book on "Discourse structure and anaphora".  She  found  that in a 
number of cases "a referent was mentioned in a statement from one participant and was 
then mentioned again in a disagreement with that statement from the other participant" 
(Fox 1987, 62).  The following example is taken from her data: 
(8)  Al:  Those were Alex's tanks weren't they? 
BI:  Pardon me? 
A2:  Weren't / didn' they belong to Alex? 
B2:  No / Alex has no tanks / Alex is trying to buy my tank 
In  B's second utterance  he  could  have  used  an anaphoric  pronoun  to  refer  to  Alex. 
Instead, he repeats the proper name.  This kind of use is probably due to the contrastive 
emphasis one uses in disagreeing with a statement. 
3.2  Reference and topic-management 
It is well known that there is an especially elose connection between reference and topic 
management  (cf.  Givon  1983).  As  I  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of this  paper,  new 
topics are often introduced by the use of full  noun phrases like descriptions and proper Coreference in Dialogue  81 
names,  whereas  continuation of topie  can be  signalIed  by  the  use  of anaphorie  pro-
nouns.  Equally, the return to the main topie after a side sequence is  often signalIed by 
means of a full  noun phrase.  These are quite  familiar  facts.  It is  however remarkable 
that the  use of pronouns  is  not  as  restrieted  as  one tends  to  believe.  This  is  another 
result of the  work done  by  Barbara  Fox.  She  found  that  in  telephone  conversations 
speakers sometimes return to the main topic after quite a long intermediate sequence by 
using a pronoun. (In artificial intelligence these cases of long-distance coreference with 
pronouns are called return pops.) This practice presupposes that speakers have a very 
good feeling for the state of the dialogue and the development of the main topic. 
3.3  Reference and communicative principles 
The third kind of connection between reference and other aspects of dialogue concerns 
reference and communicative principles.  In the  following  fictitious example the use of 
two definite descriptions simultaneously serves the aims of reference and the principles 
of originality and comprehensibility. During a meal at horne a husband wants to talk to 
his wife about the fat lady next door and at the same time he wants to  accomplish two 
extra tasks:  He wants  to  say  something  funny  and  he  does  not want his  small  son to 
understand who is being talked about.  So what he does is use a description like in (9A). 
And his wife may refer to the same person in replying with (9B): 
(9)  A:  The model next door is wearing hot pants again 
B:  Our beauty queen is getting more daring every day 
What we have here is a kind of ironie use of descriptions whieh at the same time caIcu-
lates the knowledge of a small child.  Generally speaking, definite descriptions like the 
model next door are the type of referring expression that can be used most extensively 
for  special purposes by  giving all  kinds  of extras on top  of mere identification.  Their 
use  can be  finely  tuned  to  the  knowledge  of the  participants,  to  the  state of the  dia-
logue, to the function of the utterance at hand and to  all kinds of principles, from pre-
cis ion to elegant variation. And of course they facilitate long-distance coreference as in 
the title I mentioned at the beginning 0/ this paper. 
My second example in this section concerns two related communication principles, 
the principle of comprehensibility and its dose relative, the hearer-relative principle of 
secure understanding.  In the following sequence of authentie dialogue the use of refer-
ring expressions is  partly geared towards the avoidance of miscomprehension.3 In this 
dialogue we find a lady doctor examining an elderly patient, asking her about the hear-
ing problems she has with one ear. In line 119 the patient identifies her right ear rather 
elaborately by  using  a deietic  (da)  plus  a full  noun phrase (induding a second deictic 82  Gerd Fritz 
da)  in a construction of left dislocation Da des  Ohr da,  des and goes on to describe her 
complaints with this ear.  In line  122  the doctor tries to make sure that she has got the 
reference  correct by  saying Des  rechte  Ohr  'your right  ear', which the  patient  con-
firms.  In line  123  the patient continues talking about the medical treatment of her ear 
by using the pronoun es in its reduced form ma-s, a Southem German dialect form for 
mir es ('me it'). In line 125 the doctor has another question concerning the ear. At this 
point she could easily have used a pronoun.  But to  make  sure the elderly lady  reaHy 
understands what she is  referring to,  she uses the pronoun des  and adds the fuH  noun 
phrase des  Ohr in a syntactic construction of right dislocation (und des  is  immer ver-
stoPft,  des  Ohr  'and it is  always  blocked,  your ear').  Again the  use of the  fuH  noun 
phrase on the part of the doctor is a security measure prompted by the patient'  s hearing 
problem. 
(10)119 Doctor 
Patient 
120 Doctor 
Patient 
121 Doctor 
Patient 
122 Doctor 
Augendruck. Hm.  Und Sie hören auf einem Ohr nicht so gut? 
nein  Da des Ohr da, des 
Seit wann? 
's ganz zu.  Des merk ich beim Telefonieren. Jetzt wieder seit a paar Tag. 
Aber Sie sagen, seit a paar Tagen,  ham Sie des früher scho mal ghabt? 
Des rechte Ohr 
Patient  Immer.  Jedes Jahr, ja geh ich zu Ohrenarzt, vielleicht zwei mal 
123 Patient  oder drei mal. Der tut mas na ausblasen.  Un na tut a mit a/ mit a schi 
124 Patient  (Creme), mit a schöne (Creme  ) tut a ma nei und tut des I und na 
125 Doctor  Und des is immer verstopft des Ohr?  Aber hören täts 
Patient  geht des wieder.  Ja, ja, ja 
126 Doctor  gut, wenns frei wäre?  ... Also des Ohr an sich is ned schwerhörig, sondern  ~, 
Patient  Ja 
127 Doctor  es is immer wieder verstopft?  Sie sollen heute übrigens noch 
Patient  Verstopft, ja. 
4.  Non-referential uses and modal profile 
The  second group of examples  I should like  to  discuss concerns cases where there  is 
something like coreference going on but where there is either no reference to particular 
objects at aH or where the objects referred to have some special mode of existence. Coreference in Dialogue  83 
4.1  Continuity without coreference in hypothetical talk -
Pronouns as variables and a generic use of definite descriptions 
The most prominent counterexample  to  a simple-minded  coreferential  analysis  comes 
from logic and  formal  semantics,  namely  the  use of pronouns in a way  similar to  the 
use of variables in predicate logic. (11) is a extended dialogical example for this kind of 
use: 
(11)  Al:  Anyone who tries to do this will fail 
BI:  He will in fact faH quite abominably 
A2:  He will try and try and try 
B2:  And he will become more frustrated every day 
A3:  Poor fellow, but he should have known better in the first place 
Here the use  of the  pronoun in BI  cannot be  coreferential in the  usual sense  because 
there  is  no  definite  reference  made  in  A's preceding  utterance.  Now  the  interesting 
thing from the point of view of suprasentential analysis is that this kind of non-referen-
tial connection can be  continued over a sequence of utterances.  By  the  time we  get to 
A3,  we  are beginning to  feel  sorry for the poor fellow.  But there is  no  need to  do so, 
because there is no  individual to  feel  sorry ab out.  A and B are still talking about what 
would  happen  to  someone  who  would  be  foolish  enough  to  attempt  the  impossible. 
They are talking in the hypothetical mode.  It is just the deceptive flexibility  of the use 
of pronouns that makes us  forget that there is  no  definite reference in this  case at all. 
What the use of the  pronoun really  suggests is  that if we  pick out one particular indi-
vidual to  verify our hypothesis we  have to  stick to  this  particular person.  So  the  pro-
noun signals continuity, not coreference. 
In my  second  example we  find  another type  of c1assical  referring expression not 
being  used  in  a  straightforward  referential  fashion.  This  time  we  are  dealing  with 
definite descriptions again.  The example is  taken from the transcription of an informa-
tion talk in an office of the public health insurance.  The topic of this section of talk is 
the procedure for the reimbursement of doctors' bills in cases where you have a private 
insurance on top of your public health insurance. 4 
(12)  Al:  basically we are the  insurance who pays first / we  are the public insurance 
and therefore we are entitled to have the original doctor's bills 
BI:  So you would not pay my money back ifI sent my original doctor's bill first 
to my private insurance? 
A2:  Oh  yes  we  would still pay the  money back.  In this  case we  would have to 
make do with the duplicate 
B2:  xxx (utterance not comprehensible) 84  Gerd Fritz 
A4:  because the original is  already gone  / / / but as  a rule we  ought to  have the 
original 
The dialogue goes on like this for some utterances. In this dialogue some of the defInite 
descriptions are obviously not being used referentially.  One can show this by applying 
a test. If  a use is  referential, it must make sense to ask "Which original?" or "Which 
duplicate?".  But the outcome of this test is  negative.  The participants of this dialogue 
are not talking about particular doctors' bills but about what has  to  be done with any 
doctor's bill.  So  what we  seem to  have here is  a kind of generic use  of the  defInite 
descriptions,  which is  linked to  the  hypothetical mode we use in talking about regula- ,~ 
tions. Again, we fInd continuity without strict coreference. The essential thing is that in 
order to  secure this  continuity,  speakers have  to remain in the  hypothetical mode.  In 
other words,  the  coherence  of this  dialogue  is  partly due  to  the  continuity  in modal 
profIle. 
4.2  Reference and coreference in a make-belief world 
My  fmal  example is  intended to show that things are not always  as  simple as  that.  It 
shows that even young speakers are virtuosos at crossing modal barriers.5  In the dia-
logue given under number (13)  we fInd  two  9 year-old girls playing with marbles.  At 
the  beginning of the  sequence they  are examining the different kinds  of marbles  they 
own.  However,  they  soon get bored with this  game  and  decide to  to  play  something 
different.  In utterance T2  Theresa suggests they play that they  are thieves,  and in T3 
she modifIes her suggestion to  playing thieves as husband and wife.  A second later, in 
T4, she says Diese Dukaten,  herrlich,  nicht? 'These ducats, aren't they wonderful'. So 
suddenly, with only a rather inexplicit preparation (sei nicht so gold  gierig 'don't be so 
greedy  of gold')  she  refers  to  some  golden coins  (Dukaten).  In  T5  the  transcriptor-~ 
considers  it necessary  to  explain  what  she  is  referring  to,  namely  to  some  marbles. 
Now this  commentary is  of course not quite correct.  She  is  not referring to  marbles, 
but to  ducats.  By  calling  them  ducats  in  T4  she  has  converted  them  from  everyday 
marbles  to  game  ducats.  And  thats  what  they  remain for  the  rest  of this  sequence, 
where the second girl soon joins in the new game.  An interesting passage - which is 
not on the hand-out - follows a few seconds later, when Anke asks Theresa Where did 
you get all these things jrom? And Theresa answers: From my brother. In this question-
answer pair the girls jump out of the game dialogue into areal information-giving se-
quence,  only to  return straight away  to  their game after this  short interruption.  Some 
minutes later they modify the game again. Theresa is still playing a thief who is count-
ing  his ducats.  But the other girl is  now a policeman.  He looks at a ducat and says: Coreference in Dialogue  85 
What is that? Oh,  its just a marble. That is of course quite a sophisticated move, which 
plays upon the double existence of the marble-ducats. 
(13)  Tl:  .. So (fertig), ich mach jetzt weiter!  (mit Murmeluntersuchen) Uff!  (stöhnt) 
Hast du noch Lust? 
Al: 
T2: 
A2: 
T3: 
A3: 
T4: 
T5: 
A5: 
T6: 
A6: 
T7: 
A7: 
T8: 
A8: 
T9: 
A9: 
TlO: 
AlO: 
Tl1: 
Nä-ä-ähn (= nein)!  / / Komm wir packen alles ein! 
So, nein wir spielen Diebe! 
Ja!  Diebe is'n guter Einfall! Ach ... (wühlt in den Murmeln) 
Solln wir Mann und Frau sein? Eß erst mal, Schatzi! (T spielt die Frau) 
(sagt etwas) 
Sei nich so goldgierig, wenn die Polize kommt bist'e aufgeschnappt! // ach! 
(sentimental-schwelgend) Diese Dukaten, herrlich, nicht? (= nicht wahr) 
(schwelgend-schmachtend)  Diese  Dukaten!  (=  Murmeln)  /  Guck  mal, 
Darling schenkst du mir welche? 
Ja! 
Ich möchte .. ./ öhm ich möchte mir zuerst welche aussuchen! 
Die dicksten Dukaten sind am meisten wert: 
Ach hm hm (affektiertes Getue), aber die kleinsten auch! 
(sagt etwas) haa // 
Guck  mal!  /  davon  /  eine  (Murmel),  da  haben  wir  noch  eine  /  haaach 
überrascht) da!  / 
Wo? 
Und dann haben wir auch eine / herrlich 
Wunderbar! Und weißt du was? 
Guck mal: / 
Hmm! (= gut/herrlich) 
(schmachtend) Schatz! Diese Dukaten! Guckmal wie das glitzert! 
r--.  Now what is  interesting about this  passage is  that the  transition from plain reality to 
game reality is at least partly effected by a referential link. By calling the marbles duc-
ats,  which is  a kind of baptism, Theresa introduces the ducat-game.  The accessiblility 
of the make-belief world rests on the girls' mutual knowledge that the game ducats are 
identical to  the real world marbles.  What is  especially remarkable is  that the  children 
manage the transition from reality to game and back again without any extra commen-
tary.  So this example shows that the continuity of modal profile is not a strict require-
ment in naturally occurring dialogue. If  there is enough mutual knowledge as to what is 
going on, just ab out anything goes. 
This does of course not show that there is no room for serious research on the con-
straints on the kinds of transitions that are allowed. It does however show that the focus 
on  constraints  has  to  be  counterbalanced  by  the  focus  on  speakers'  resources  for 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
I should like to conelude this paper by summarizing the main points: 
1.  Singular identifying reference to real world objects and coreference to such objects 
mentioned earlier in the discourse certainly is a prototypical example of the general 
activity of talking about things, if not the prototype of this activity. When we take a 
eloser look at the overall practice, however, it turns out to be just one member of a 
ramified  family  of action  patterns  that  could  be  subsumed  under  the  description 
"talking  about  the  same  thing(s)  and  kind(s)  of thing(s)" . We  have  to  take  into 
consideration patterns  like  introducing  new  objects  (new  theoretical  entities,  fic- .  ---. 
tional objects), introducing (and cross-reference to)  hypothetical objects,  reference 
to  objects  of doubtful  standing  like  witches  and  ufos  (where  cross-reference  in-
volves  "intentional identity"; cf.  Geach 1972),  reference to  abstract objects,  refer-
ence to kinds of objects,  indefinite reference, plural reference, reference by  means 
of metaphorical uses etc. 
2.  Different kinds of talking about the  same thing (and thereby creating continuity in 
discourse)  are  elosely  connected  to  specific  forms  of discourse/dialogue  and  the 
principles of organization that form the basis of these forms of discourse/dialogue. 
Fictional narrative,  for  example,  is  partly founded  on the patterns  for  introducing 
fictional  objects.  The  fact  that  linguistically  reference  to  fictional  objects  works 
fundamentally the same way  as  reference to  real  world objects should not obscure 
the  fact  that they  are  distinct act patterns  that  follow  different pragmatical  mIes. 
Problem-solving and planning dialogues often involve the introduction of hypotheti-
cal objects which have to be dealt with as apart of emergency planning.  (A:  What 
happens if there is a night watchman on  the prernises? B:  We  shall have to keep 
hirn quiet.) Dialogues of seeking and finding often proceed from the specification of 
the  properties a candidate object should possess and end up by identifying an ade-
quate object. (A:  We have to find a new president. B:  He should be at least six foot 
tall and good-Iooking. C: And he should know the rules of  the society.  . .. ) 
3.  Transitions from one type of dialogue to  the other often involve a transition in the 
way one talks about things and a transition with respect to  the kinds of things one 
talks about (e.g.  from ufos  to  Mercedes cars).  There is  so far not much empirical 
research on the  strategies and  resources  speakers use to  manage  these  transitions. 
The main resource is  certainly mutual knowledge,  which has to be kept up to date 
to facilitate transitions.  So the topic of talking about the same thing is elosely con-
nected to the topic of the dynamics of mutual knowledge. 
4.  Finally, these questions are not only theoretically exciting but they are also impor-
tant from the point of view of possible applications.  Both in natural language pro-Coreference in Dialogue  87 
cessing and in comprehensibility research - just to  name two fields - it is essen-
tial to get a better idea of what strategies and resources speakers and hearers use in 
tracking what is being talked about. 
Notes 
1)  It  is  remarkable  that the  authors  of a  book  like  "Cohesion in English"  (Halliday/Hasan  1976) 
should not have taken notice of. what was going on contemporaneously in the theory of reference. 
As  a  consequence of this  neglect their treatment of problems of reference and coreference is  a 
weak point in their otherwise valuable book. 
2)  A more detailed description of these organizing principles and their theoretical background can be 
found in Fritz (1994). 
3)  The transcription is taken from Redder/Ehlich (1994, 285). 
4)  The text is an English translation of a transcription given in "Texte gesprochener deutscher Stan-
dardsprache III: Alltagsgespräche" (1975, 136f.). 
5)  The following  transcription is  taken from  Wagner (1975,  186f.).  A short discussion of this dia-
logue is given in my book on coherence (Fritz 1982, 174ff.). 
References 
Asher, N. (1993), Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse, DordrechtIBostonlLondon. 
Clark, H.H./Wilkes-Gibbs, D. (1986), Referring as a Collaborative Process. In: Cognition 22, 1-39. 
Donnellan, K.S.  (1966),  Reference and DefInite Descriptions. In:  The Philosophical Review 75, 281-
304. 
Fox, B.A. (1986), Discourse Structure and anaphora, Cambridge. 
Fritz, G. (1982), Kohärenz. Grundlagen der linguistischen Kommunikationsanalyse, Tübingen. 
Fritz,  G.  (1994),  Grundlagen der Dialogorganisation.  In:  Fritz, G./Hundsnurscher,  F. (eds.),  Hand-
buch der Dialoganalyse. Tübingen, 177-201. 
Geach, P.T. (1962), Reference and Generality, Ithaca/London. 
Geach, P.T. (1972), Intentional Identity. In: Geach, P.T., Logic Matters, Oxford, 146-152. 
Givon, T. (1983), Topic Continuity in Discourse: An Introduction. In:  Givon, T. (ed.), Topic Continu-
ity in Discourse: A Quantitative Cross-language Study. Arnsterdam/Philadelphia, 1-42. 
Grosz,  B.J./Joshi, A.K./Weinstein, S.  (1995),  Centering:  A Framework for Modeling the Local Co-
herence of Discourse. In: Computational Linguistics 21, 203-225. 
Halliday, M.A.K./Hasan, R.  (1976), Cohesion in English, London. 
Hobbs, J.R. (1979), Coherence and Coreference. In: Cognitive Science 3,67-90. 
Kamp,  H.  (1985),  Context, Thought and Communication. In:  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
85,239-261. 
Krifka, M.  (ed.) (1988), Genericity in Natural Language.  Proceedings of the  1988 Tübingen Confer-
ence, SNS-Report 88-42. 
Pause, P.E. (1984), Das Kumulationsprinzip - eine Grundlage für die Rekonstruktion von Textverste-
hen und Textverständlichkeit. In:  Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik 55, 38-56. 
Quine, W.V.O. (1960), Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass. 
Redder,  A./Ehlich, K.  (eds.)  (1994),  Gesprochene Sprache.  Transkripte und Tondokumente.  Phonai 
41, Tübingen. 
Schegloff, E.A. (1972), Notes on a Conversational Practice: Formulating Place. In: Sudnow, D. (ed.), 
Studies in Social Interaction, New York/London, 75-119. 
Searle, J.R. (1969), Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge. 
Stati, S.  (1990): Le transphrastique, Paris. 
Strawson, P.F. (1964), Identifying Reference and Truth-values. In: Theoria 30,96-118. 88  Gerd Fritz 
Texte  gesprochener  deutscher  Standardsprache  111.  Alltagsgespr,äche.  Heutiges  Deutsch,  Reihe  11: 
Texte. Bd.  3. München 1975. 
Tyler,LK./Marslen-Wilson, W.  (1982):  The resolution of discourse anaphora:  Some on-line studies. 
In: Text 2,264-291. 
Wagner, K.R. (1,975):  Die Sprechsprache des Kindes. Teil 2.: Korpus und Lexikon. Düsseldorf. 